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Introduction
Farming is a heterogeneous sector in a complex and 
multi-faceted environment facing a variety of sources of 
risk beyond the control of farmers (McElwee and Bosworth, 
2010). Farm income is subject to a wide range of environ-
mental, technological and economic perturbations, as well as 
structural changes in policy and institutions. These multifac-
eted dynamics and confl icting demands generate unexpected 
outcomes with volatile income streams for the entire agricul-
tural value chain (Darnhofer et al., 2016). Within this con-
text, farmers need to apply strategies and instruments to bal-
ance their income and risks and to achieve income stability 
(Hardaker et al., 2004). The reduction of risks to income over 
time will improve farmers’ well-being, their competitiveness 
and the ability to expand their operations through innovation 
and the appropriate investment decisions (EP, 2014).
Extensive theoretical and empirical research has been 
conducted to understand the issue of risk and to develop 
instruments to support farmers (see, for example, OECD, 
2009; Kimura et al., 2010). Options include risk-transfer 
strategies (marketing contracts, production contracts, hedg-
ing on future markets, participation in mutual funds and 
insurance) or on-farm measures (selection of products, 
diversifi cation, self-insurance, farm fi nancial management 
and savings/credit) (Meuwissen et al., 1999).
Diversifi cation is widely used in agriculture to deal with 
multiple sources of risk. Through diversifi cation, being 
either multi-commodity farm activities or combining on-
farm and off-farm income or a combination of both, risks 
are mitigated, enabling more stable incomes to be gener-
ated (Hardaker et al., 2004; Bowman and Zilberman, 2013; 
Barnes et al., 2015). Certain characteristics are associated 
with diversifi cation, for example, age, education, farm size, 
fi nancial structure, labour use and farming experience (Bow-
man and Zilberman, 2013; Barnes et al., 2015).
Marketing or production contracts transfer risk along the 
food chain. A marketing contract is an agreement between a 
farmer and a buyer to sell a commodity at a specifi ed price 
before the commodity is ready to be marketed (Goodhue 
and Hoffmann, 2006). The risk shifting characteristics of the 
received contract depend mainly on its terms (e.g. variable 
benchmark price versus fi xed price). The farmer keeps full 
responsibility for all production management decisions but 
he/she loses the opportunity of achieving a higher price on the 
open market. Although the empirical literature highlights the 
main determinants of choosing marketing channels, such as 
locational and geographical disparities, temporal specifi cities, 
and transaction costs in combination with farm and farmer 
characteristics, there is little information available about the 
risk transfer throughout the value chain (OECD, 2000).
Production contracts typically give the contractor control 
over the production process. This kind of contract specifi es 
the quality and the quantity of the product, the price to be 
paid to the farmer and the inputs to be used. For example, 
uptake of price contracts is a common practice applied on 
Dutch arable farms. Approximately 50 per cent of the Dutch 
arable farmers have some kind of potato price contract of 
which the pool contracts and fi xed price contracts are the 
most common (Van Asseldonk and Van der Meer, 2016). 
Farmers shift the price risk to the processor but are depend-
ent on only one buyer. In the USA, production contracts have 
been shown to reduce income risk to a large extent, increase 
specialisation on farms, help create lower costs and improve 
effi ciency (Harwood et al., 1999). However, production con-
tracts have been criticised because they limit farmers’ entre-
preneurial capacity, reduce farmers’ autonomy, and may 
increase other types of risks such as quality, investment and 
contractual risks (OECD, 2000).
Agricultural insurance has a long history and plays a 
signifi cant role in the compensation of crop damage (hail, 
drought), livestock disease outbreaks, farm assets and disa-
bility of farmers (Hardaker et al., 2004). Insurance tools have 
been included in the risk management toolkit of the recently-
reformed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (EC, 2013a). 
The tools available to manage agricultural risk through 
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insurance are very diverse and not common for all EU Mem-
ber States. There are mainly single-risk insurance tools (such 
as hail or frost insurance) while some Member States (e.g. 
France, Italy and Spain) also have multi-peril risk insur-
ance schemes that secure against different kinds of weather 
risks, but yield and revenue insurances are far less devel-
oped (Bielza et al., 2008). In contrast, in some non-European 
countries more sophisticated tools are available (Mahul and 
Stutley, 2010). The agricultural insurance spectrum ranges 
from Member States in which the public sector provides no 
support (private non-subsided insurance schemes), those in 
which governments heavily subsidise agricultural insurance 
up to Member States, such as Greece and Cyprus, where the 
system is public and mandatory (Bielza et al., 2008).
In practice, agricultural insurance has been a costly way 
of transferring the risk from farmers to governments and 
other insurers (Nelson and Loehman, 1987). In the EU there 
is a discussion on the role of policy measures and the devel-
opment of the corresponding market. Furthermore, farmers’ 
preferences, the perception of risks, farm and farmer charac-
teristics are factors that infl uence the demand for agricultural 
insurance. Agricultural insurance also faces the problem of 
asymmetric information which refers either to moral hazard 
or adverse selection problems. Some attempts aim to allevi-
ate these problems (e.g. farmer mutual funds, index-based 
insurance) with the support of the CAP reforms (2014-2020) 
that allow premium subsidies.
Thus, European farmers may choose from three general 
types of risk management strategies: on-farm (e.g. diversi-
fi cation), price risk transfer (e.g. contracts) and yield risk 
transfer (i.e. insurance with or without public assistance). 
This paper examines the adoption rates and determinants of 
farmers’ choice of such strategies. We consider insurance 
contracts, price contracts, off-farm income, other risk reduc-
tion measures and other gainful activities, and our analysis is 
conducted using farm-level data for farms located in eight 
EU Member States.
Methodology
Econometric model
For farmers, whether or not to adopt a specifi c risk man-
agement tool is often a continuous-choice decision (e.g. 
to adopt more or less on-farm diversifi cation or rely more 
or less on off-farm income). Also the decision to insure or 
hedge follows a (binary) adoption decision and a (continu-
ous) conditional decision about the amount (e.g. proportion 
of production insured or hedged). In the current approach, the 
adoption of a specifi c risk management tool is therefore mod-
elled as a discrete-choice decision (and continuous variables 
are recoded into binary values). Binary specifi cations are 
often used for the evaluation of actual or hypothetical deci-
sions about insurance purchase with numerous explanatory 
variables (i.e. Ganderton et al., 2000; Sherrick et al., 2004).
Given the hierarchical classifi cation of farms into farm-
ing type for all EU Member States, farm data are naturally 
nested in farming type and Member States. This hierarchical 
structure gives rise to multi-level mixed-effects modelling 
by incorporating random effects at the levels of Member 
States and farming type (Andrews et al., 2006). In this paper, 
three-level mixed-effects logistic models were used to deter-
mine which factors infl uence the choice to adopt insurance 
or other risk management strategies. The demand is likely 
to differ substantially between the relevant farming types 
as a result of numerous distinct factors such as tilling sea-
son, susceptibility of crops and livestock, and possibilities 
to adopt preventive measures. Moreover, Member States 
differ in supply conditions (e.g. availability of premium 
subsidies, price contracts and disaster Member State relief 
programmes) and differences in demand (e.g. cultural differ-
ences). Formally, the econometric model for the probability 
of adoption is described as follows:
Pr (yijk = 1 | xijk, wj, zjk ) = H (xijkβ + wj + zjk + εijk ) (1)
where Pr (yijk = 1 | xijk, wj, zjk ) denotes the conditional probabil-
ity of yijk = 1 given a set of variables xijk, wj and zjk, yijk is a 
binary indicator of a specifi c risk management tool adoption 
decision on farm in 2015 (value 1 for adopters and 0 for non-
adopters) taken by farmer i in farming system k in Member 
State j, xijk is a vector of explanatory variables related to 
demand factors. In equation (1), H (∙) is the logistic cumula-
tive distribution function ( ) which maps
the linear predictor to the probability of adoption (yijk = 1). 
In this model, the linear combination xijkβ represents the 
fi xed effects of the explanatory variables on the likelihood 
of adoption. The terms wj and zjk represent random effects at 
the level of Member States and farming type respectively. εijk 
represents the random error term at farm level. The model is 
estimated using the melogit procedure of Stata® 14.0 (Stata-
Corp LLC, College Station TX, USA).
The adoption of one strategy can affect (substitute or 
complement) adoption of another strategy (e.g. impact and 
thus need for a price contract is less for a well-diversifi ed 
farm in comparison to a mono-cropping farm). Therefore, 
regression models for each risk management strategy are 
estimated in which the explanatory variables comprise the 
simultaneous adoption decision of other risk management 
strategies. Similar three-level logistic models are applied as 
presented in Equation 1 to estimate odds ratios.
Data
In the selection plan the heterogeneity of the farming 
sector was explicitly considered. In designing the selection 
plan the same stratifi cation was used as in Farm Account-
ancy Data Network (FADN) (EC, 2015) which is based on 
farming type and farm economic size classes. The theory of 
stratifi ed sampling shows that the optimal allocation of the 
sample size across strata depends on the number of units 
(farms) in the strata and the homogeneity of farms in a stra-
tum (Cochran, 1977). The outcome of this step (the optimal 
sample design) was further restricted to fi t the purpose of the 
project to test the feasibility and added value of collecting 
this type of data. Firstly, at least 25 observations per farm-
ing type were required for meaningful statistical analysis. 
Secondly, at least two Member States were selected for each 
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main farming type to enable cross-country comparison. 
Therefore, the sample was limited to the most important 
farming types in each Member State.
In line with the regular FADN data collection, the data 
collection was organised in different ways in each of the par-
ticipating countries in terms of who collected the data and 
how the data were collected (Vrolijk et al., 2016). Collection 
processes and strategies were designed and collectors were 
trained to ensure uniform data gathering with respect to the 
additional risk management indicators. Data collection was 
fi nalised in the spring of 2016 on the calendar year 2015. 
The risk management data (and other additional indicators 
collected in the EU Framework 7 FLINT, Farm-Level Indi-
cators for New Topics in Policy Evaluation) were merged 
with the FADN database. The analysis in this paper is based 
on data from 821 farmers collected in eight Member States.
Adoption variables
The adoption models focused on the actual participation 
decision. This information was elicited during the FLINT 
project. Three complementing or substitute mainstream 
categories of risk management strategies were identifi ed, 
namely, insurances, contracts and alternative methods (such 
as diversifi cation and off-farm income).
Four sub-categories of insurance coverage were included: 
crop insurance, livestock insurance, property insurance and 
occupational accident insurance. Insured perils were elic-
ited as well (multiple selections were allowed) for crop 
insurance and property insurance allowing to distinct hail, 
storm, excessive rainfall, drought, frost and other perils (e.g. 
fi re). Moreover, a distinction was made between a coverage 
reimbursing only the direct losses of replacing the damaged 
goods or a coverage also reimbursing consequential losses 
due to lost business revenues.
The category of price contracts focused on the most 
important formal contracts in terms of sales values of a farm. 
A maximum of four contracts for the main agricultural outputs 
were considered. Contracts only focused on the marketing of 
agricultural or horticultural outputs, consequently manure 
contracts and energy supply contracts were excluded. Six 
characteristics per contract were derived: contracted output 
(i.e. 18 classes of crops or livestock); price type of contract 
(i.e. market price, pool price, minimum price or fi xed price); 
contracted amount (i.e. fi xed quantity or supply obligation); 
duration (one year or less versus multiple years); contracted 
turnover (i.e. < 20 per cent, [20-50 per cent ˃ , [50-79 per 
cent ˃ , [80-99 per cent ˃ , 100 per cent); and other contract 
characteristics (e.g. fi xed or fl exible delivery date, specifi ed 
quality standards).
The alternative risk mitigation or adaptation strategies 
included a set of other measures that contribute to risk reduc-
tion and a set of other gainful activities. Measures that could 
contribute to risk reduction included diversifi cation, off-farm 
employment, off-farm investment, avoiding use of credit, 
hedging (futures and options) and holding fi nancial reserves. 
Multiple other gainful activities were included, ranging from 
farm tourism, processing of agricultural products, child/
healthcare, nature management, production of renewable 
energy and contract work for others.
Explanatory variables
The demand for risk management strategies is often 
hypothesised to be infl uenced by numerous explanatory vari-
ables (see, for example, Goodwin, 1993). In the multivariate 
regression analysis, explanatory variables described farm 
structure, farm income, farm fi nancing and personal char-
acteristics.
The hypothesis is that farm structure infl uences the 
adoption of risk management instruments. Two main com-
ponents of farm structure, namely farming type and farm 
size, were distinguished. Risks and the rationale of adopt-
ing specifi c risk management strategies differ for obvious 
reasons between agricultural produce (e.g. losses as a result 
of adverse weather affecting farms with fi eld crops and the 
adoption of crop insurance). Therefore, the major segmenta-
tion variable used in this research is farming type based on 
Eurostat’s farm typology (FADN code: GENERAL). Eight 
farming types are listed as dummy variables in the analysis, 
i.e. farms with mainly fi eld crops, horticulture, wine, other 
permanent crops, milk, other grazing livestock, granivores or 
mixed (i.e. crops and livestock). The classifi cation of farms 
according to type is based on the (relative) mix of their out-
put. The impact of farm size was previously tested by, for 
example, Goodwin et al. (2004) and Sherrick et al. (2004), 
who found a positive relationship between farm size and 
insurance purchase. Farm economic size is included as a lin-
ear variable and expressed in standard output units (FADN 
code SE005).
Two variables were included as indicators for farm 
income, namely farm net income (FADN code SE420) and 
total subsidies received (FADN code SE605). Farm net 
income is the remuneration to the unpaid factors of farm pro-
duction (i.e. work, land and capital) and a reward for taking 
risks. Farms with higher farm income may have less need to 
adopt risk management strategies because of opportunities for 
self-fi nancing adverse losses. The reverse situation could be 
hypothesised for farmers with low income. The total amount 
of subsidies received on current operations included EU-
fi nanced and co-fi nanced decoupled and coupled payments. 
In the EU, direct payments represent around 30 per cent of 
farm income (but this differs between farming types). It has 
been claimed that such payments have an income stabilising 
role (Cafi ero et al., 2007) and the somewhat scant empirical 
evidence available supports this hypothesis (Agrosynergie 
2011; El Benni et al. 2012). The fact that direct payments are 
fi xed induces a decrease in the variability of income and cre-
ates what is called a ‘wealth effect’. This additional stream 
of income affects preferences for adopting risk management 
strategies. For this reason, it is not easy to disentangle the 
risk management component from the support component of 
many measures (OECD, 2009).
The fi nancial structure of the farm is often tested in 
explaining adoption of risk management strategies. Farmers 
with more debt (total liabilities, FADN code SE485) would 
be expected to adopt more often risk management strategies 
(Ganderton et al., 2000; Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Mishra 
et al., 2005; Sherrick et al., 2004). The reverse situation may 
be hypothesised for farmers with larger net worth (total assets 
FADN code SE501). Ultimately, the capacity to bear the risk 
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will affect the demand for risk management strategies. There-
fore, the holding’s capacity for saving and self-fi nancing in 
terms of receipts minus expenditure for the accounting year, 
not taking into account operations on capital and on debts and 
loans, could affect demand (cash fl ow, FADN code SE526). 
The previously-described FADN indicators for fi nancial 
structure are all included as explanatory variables.
Other explanatory variables included were age and train-
ing of the farmer. Both personal characteristics are often 
used in demand studies (Sherrick et al., 2004; Ogurtsov et 
al., 2007; Mishra et al., 2005). but the direction of the effect 
is diffi cult to predict and is often non-signifi cant. From the 
FLINT survey the use of advisory services in terms of total 
number of times of personal contact with an advisor was 
included as an indicator for training.
Results
Adoption of insurance
All farming types in this study cultivated land and hence 
crop insurance adoption was estimated for all surveyed 
farms. Adoption of livestock insurance was analysed for the 
relevant farming types (i.e. grazing livestock, granivores, 
mixed livestock holdings and mixed crops – livestock hold-
ings). Although elicited separately, it is questionable whether 
respondents were aware of the distinction between direct 
and indirect coverages for crop and livestock insurance. 
Enumerators did not in all cases cross-check policy docu-
ments (to confi rm either direct, indirect or both). Therefore, 
adoption rates were aggregated and adopters were those who 
have subscribed to at least one coverage. Adoption rates for 
building insurance and occupational accident insurance were 
aggregated for all farming types in the survey (Table 1).
Adoption of crop insurance varies across Member States, 
and this can be explained in part in the light of availability of 
public support. In Ireland, subsidised crop insurance is not 
available, which may have hampered demand for insurance. 
In Finland crop insurance is not adopted since the existing 
Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) scheme was abolished 
in 2015 as a result of inherent defi ciencies in the CDC sys-
tem (Myyrä and Jauhiainen, 2012). Most analysed Member 
States with higher adoption rates have opted for public sup-
port to promote demand with the exception of Germany. This 
could be the risk management toolkit under Articles 37-39 
of EU (2013b) (e.g. subsidised multi-peril crop insurance in 
The Netherlands). Other Member States that have chosen 
not to make use of the toolkit despite the possibility of EU 
co-fi nancing continued their national subsidised insurance 
schemes under the state aid rules (e.g. Spain) or deploy other 
policy instruments to increase uptake (EP, 2014).
Germany has a long tradition of private-based crop insur-
ance with high adoption rates of predominately hail insur-
ance (to a lesser extent this also holds for the Netherlands). 
Both Member States also have high adoption rates of private-
based livestock insurance. In Germany most insurance poli-
cies sold are the standard epidemic livestock coverage, while 
in the Netherlands farmers take out cover protecting their 
livestock against accidents such ventilation breakdowns and 
fi re. Livestock insurance uptake is highest in Spain, Greece 
and Finland (note that in Spain livestock insurance is subsi-
dised and in Greece it is mandatory).
Uptake of building insurance and occupational accident 
insurance is on average high across all Member States with 
the exception of building insurance in Greece and occupa-
tional accident insurance in Hungary.
Adoption of contracts
The level of price protection depends on the type of price 
contract and contracted turnover. Descriptive statistics show 
distinct adoption rates of market price, pool price, mini-
mum price or fi xed price contracts (Table 2). The contracted 
amount was in the majority of cases below 50 per cent of 
the total turnover. Price contracts are less frequently applied 
in Ireland and Greece. However, the adoption rate is also 
low in Finland if market price contracts are excluded from 
the analysis. In a market price contract the price a farmer 
receives only depends on the market price (i.e. benchmark) 
at the moment of delivery, which provides no protection and 
Table 1: Percentage adoption by farmers of crop, livestock, building and occupational accident insurance and number of observations per 
EU Member State.
Member State Crop Livestock Building Occupational accident
Adoption n Adoption n Adoption n Adoption n
Finland  0  50 90 49 100  50  96  50
Germany 61  52 51 35  88  52  77  52
Greece 90 124 93 30   0 124 100 124
Hungary 34 102 11 64  39 102  13 102
Ireland  0  64 11 64  86  50  56  64
Netherlands 35 155 56 82  95 155  55 155
Poland 41 146  9 87  97 146  82 146
Spain 50 128 95 69  54 128  64 128
Source: own data
Table 2: Percentage adoption by farmers of different types of 
contracts and number of observations per Member State.
Member 
State
No price 
contract
Market 
price
Pool 
price
Minimum 
price
Fixed 
price n
Finland  34 56  0 0 10  50
Germany  35 27  2 0 37  52
Greece  70 19  2 0  9 124
Hungary  35 36  0 0 28 102
Ireland 100  0  0 0  0  64
Netherlands  28 12 29 9 22 155
Poland  49 29  6 5 12 146
Spain  16 59  9 1 15 128
Source: own data
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can be seen as a delivery contract. Yet in a pool contract a 
famer receives the average market value of a commodity 
over a specifi ed period and thus smooths price volatility to a 
certain extent. Protection increases if the contract guarantees 
a minimum price. If the market price at the moment of deliv-
ery is higher than the specifi ed minimum price, the farmer 
will benefi t from this higher price. Given a fi xed price the 
contract specifi es a pre-determined price for which the prod-
uct is delivered. If the market price is higher than the fi xed 
price the farmer will not benefi t from this higher price. Mem-
ber States with the highest adoption of price contracts (pool, 
minimum or fi xed) are the Netherlands and Germany with 
adoption rates of 60 and 38 per cent respectively. Contracted 
activities mainly comprised cereals, industrial crops, pota-
toes and milk. In three quarters of the contracts the duration 
was one year or less and quality standards were specifi ed in 
50 per cent of the contracts.
Adoption of other risk management 
strategies or gainful activities
The adoption rates of other risk management strategies 
or adopting other gainful activities also greatly differ across 
Member States (Table 3). The highest reported overall adop-
tion rates included the avoidance of credit use to minimising 
external dependency, diversifi cation to reduce the variabil-
ity of farm income, holding fi nancial reserves to ride out 
adverse times and off-farm employment to diversify income 
streams. Hedging by using futures and options to limit or 
offset the probability of loss from fl uctuations in agricultural 
commodity prices was least preferred in almost all Member 
States. The use of specifi ed strategies differed between farm-
ing types partly because of how the typology of farms was 
defi ned (e.g. mixed farming systems apply diversifi cation by 
defi nition) and inherent characteristics of a farming system 
(e.g. fi eld crop farms, particularly arable farms, apply diver-
sifi cation widely not only as a risk management tool but also 
for agronomic reasons).
The aforementioned binary elicited FLINT indicators are 
more subjective indicators that express the importance from 
a farmer’s viewpoint, while some can also be objectively 
quantifi ed with FADN data directly. The amount of fi nancial 
reserves and credit avoidance correspond respectively with 
total farm savings and the opposite of a farm’s total liabilities, 
or a relative measure such as solvency rate. Moreover, quan-
tifying the heterogeneity of diversifi cation can be measured 
straightforwardly with an index on the basis of the revenue 
stemming from each activity jointly determining total output.
Determinants of adoption
The determinants of adoption of 12 distinct risk manage-
ment strategies were estimated. A hedging demand model 
was not estimated because generating robust estimates was 
not feasible given the limited uptake. The three-level model 
with two random-effects equations comprises 39 farming 
type levels from eight Member States levels in the upper two 
levels. Estimated fi xed effects of the explanatory variables 
and the random effects at the level of Member States and 
farming type are presented in Table 4. Likelihood-ratio tests 
comparing each model to its ordinary logistic regression 
approach showed that all were highly signifi cant for these 
data. Reversing the order of the upper two levels did not 
affect the main fi ndings.
The larger farms adopted crop insurance, occupational 
accident insurance, contracts and diversifi cation more often 
but were less likely to adopt credit avoidance and off-farm 
employment (at a signifi cance level of 1 per cent). Although 
the latter strategies are considered very effective, they may 
affect the effi ciency of scale (and thus limits prospects of 
higher average incomes). Note that the perceived adoption of 
applying fi nancial strategies (i.e. credit avoidance or holding 
fi nancial reserves) was indeed objectively confi rmed by lower 
liabilities and higher assets as recorded in FADN. With respect 
to random effects, it can be concluded that the adoption of risk 
management strategies was signifi cantly affected by farming 
type while the Member State effect was not signifi cant.
The relationship between adoptions of different strategies 
was also analysed with a three-level mixed-effects logistic 
regression model to determine whether they are substitutes 
(OR < 1) or complements (OR > 1) (Table 5). The main fi nd-
ings are described within and between the three mainstream 
categories of risk management strategies (i.e. insurances, 
contracts and alternative methods). Within-category odds 
ratios revealed that uptake is positively associated (OR > 1). 
For example, adopters of occupational health insurance were 
statistically signifi cantly two or three times more likely to 
adopt other insurance coverages as well. Signifi cant ORs 
within the category of alternative methods revealed that most 
strategies complemented each other. For example, farmers 
opting for credit avoidance were three times more likely 
also to hold fi nancial reserves. Between the categories of 
alternative risk management strategies signifi cant results on 
complementing or substituting choices are more mixed. For 
example, farmers opting for crop insurance were 2.5 times 
more likely to use price contracts as well, but half as likely 
to have off-farm employment.
Table 3: Percentage adoption by farmers of other risk management strategies and number of observations per Member State.
Member State Diversifi cation On-farm processing/sales
Off-farm 
investment
Credit 
avoidance Hedging
Financial 
reserves
Off-farm 
employment
Other gainful 
activities n
Finland 40 18 26 66 4 36 44 32  50
Germany 54 17 19 46 0 64 60 64  52
Greece 90 18  2 69 0 68 23 13 124
Hungary 38  8  6 40 4 38 43 16 102
Ireland 30  0 14 53 3 50 53  2  64
Netherlands 33 10  8 16 2 14 51 46 155
Poland 62  7  2 45 3 40 26 14 146
Spain 28 13  2 59 0  9 23 12 128
Source: own data
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Table 4: Estimates of the adoption models (parameters are odds ratios) and standard errors for insurance and other risk management 
strategies.
Variables Crop insurance
Livestock 
insurance
Building 
insurance
Occu-
pational 
accident 
insurance
Price 
contract
Diversifi -
cation
On-farm 
process-
ing/sales
Off-farm 
invest-
ment
Credit 
avoid-
ance
Financial 
reserves
Off-farm 
employ-
ment
Other 
gainful 
activities
Fixed effects
Size class 1.548***(0.160)
1.289
(0.202)
0.973
(0.121)
1.388***
(0.114)
1.737***
(0.192)
1.470***
(0.133)
0.995
(0.116)
1.057
(0.145)
0.779***
(0.0594)
1.081
(0.0868)
0.712***
(0.0493)
0.910
(0.0801)
Total farm 
output‡
0.992
(0.00716)
1.010
(0.00920)
0.992
(0.00997)
1.003
(0.00504)
0.983**
(0.00712)
0.986**
(0.00719)
0.992
(0.0102)
0.997
(0.00819)
1.010
(0.00609)
0.999
(0.00681)
1.006
(0.00429)
0.996
(0.00466)
Farm net 
income‡
1.003
(0.0178)
0.997
(0.0247)
0.995
(0.0302)
0.984
(0.0143)
0.981
(0.0182)
0.994
(0.0175)
1.001
(0.0272)
1.005
(0.0264)
0.992
(0.0164)
0.987
(0.0165)
0.994
(0.0132)
1.017
(0.0147)
Total 
subsidies‡
0.944
(0.0389)
1.104
(0.0669)
1.035
(0.0684)
0.943
(0.0342)
0.925
(0.0438)
1.007
(0.0321)
1.061*
(0.0362)
1.061*
(0.0354)
0.952
(0.0312)
0.996
(0.0312)
1.025
(0.0282)
1.056*
(0.0319)
Total 
liabilities‡
1.000
(0.00278)
1.000
(0.00303)
1.004
(0.00637)
1.001
(0.00189)
0.994*
(0.00319)
0.995
(0.00330)
0.999
(0.00431)
1.000
(0.00347)
0.988***
(0.00372)
0.992**
(0.00339)
0.999
(0.00189)
0.999
(0.00252)
Total 
assets‡
1.001
(0.00134)
0.999
(0.00119)
1.003
(0.00271)
0.999
(0.000837)
1.005***
(0.00180)
1.002
(0.00135)
1.000
(0.00155)
1.002
(0.00118)
1.002*
(0.00105)
1.002**
(0.00110)
1.001
(0.000774)
1.002**
(0.00111)
Cash fl ow‡ 1.009(0.00685)
0.988
(0.00983)
1.008
(0.00982)
1.000
(0.00461)
1.017**
(0.00734)
1.009
(0.00682)
0.997
(0.00982)
0.992
(0.00940)
0.994
(0.00593)
1.004
(0.00604)
0.998
(0.00406)
1.007
(0.00471)
Age 1.002(0.0107)
0.984
(0.0140)
0.988
(0.0128)
0.985
(0.00950)
0.999
(0.0107)
0.990
(0.00887)
0.996
(0.0119)
1.011
(0.0144)
1.004
(0.00803)
0.991
(0.00845)
0.963***
(0.00777)
0.975***
(0.00934)
Advisory 1.008(0.0125)
1.023
(0.0211)
0.996
(0.0188)
0.986
(0.0128)
0.990
(0.0133)
1.025*
(0.0134)
0.965*
(0.0200)
1.022
(0.0205)
0.995
(0.0104)
0.994
(0.0114)
1.003
(0.0109)
0.986
(0.0144)
Constant 0.0268***(0.0339)
0.00829***
(0.0128)
6.179
(10.11)
1.012
(1.170)
0.00563***
(0.00579)
0.123**
(0.115)
0.179*
(0.178)
0.0167***
(0.0221)
5.074**
(3.555)
0.510
(0.415)
40.93***
(29.74)
1.230
(1.065)
Random effects
Member 
State
189.1
(717.2)
1.000
(0.0493)
251,882
(2.193e+06)
414.0
(1,529)
1.623
(1.350)
6.470
(8.404)
1
(0)
2.015
(1.201)
1.464
(0.466)
2.905
(1.973)
2.102*
(0.903)
3.501
(2.701)
Farming 
type
30.45**
(41.09)
1.565e+06**
(1.087e+07)
3.034**
(1.612)
1.190
(0.173)
14.93**
(16.37)
4.958**
(3.194)
2.453**
(1.046)
1.512
(0.672)
1.408**
(0.228)
1.795*
(0.537)
1.065
(0.101)
1.016
(0.107)
Number of observations = 782; number of groups = 8; standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; ‡ EUR 10,000
Source: own data
Table 5: Estimates of the adoption models (parameters are odds ratios) and standard errors between risk management strategies.
Variables Crop insurance
Livestock 
insurance
Building 
insurance
Occu-
pational 
accident 
insurance
Price 
contract
Diversifi -
cation
On-farm 
process-
ing/sales
Off-farm 
invest-
ment
Credit 
avoid-
ance
Financial 
reserves
Off-farm 
employ-
ment
Other 
gainful 
activities
Fixed effects
Crop insur-
ance
1.596
(0.586)
1.314
(0.493)
2.223***
(0.571)
2.572***
(0.671)
1.577*
(0.385)
0.599*
(0.183)
1.517
(0.581)
0.685*
(0.152)
0.908
(0.216)
0.526***
(0.106)
1.926***
(0.430)
Livestock 
insurance
1.326
(0.491)
6.679***
(3.734)
2.772***
(0.784)
1.365
(0.445)
1.919**
(0.629)
1.523
(0.553)
0.664
(0.287)
0.667
(0.182)
0.751
(0.226)
0.835
(0.191)
1.001
(0.248)
Building 
insurance
1.673
(0.656)
4.904***
(2.620)
1.823**
(0.551)
1.727
(0.606)
0.860
(0.257)
0.924
(0.359)
1.097
(0.584)
1.546
(0.436)
1.145
(0.360)
1.032
(0.249)
1.650
(0.547)
Occupation-
al accident 
insurance
2.361***
(0.696)
2.572***
(0.817)
1.636
(0.511)
1.489
(0.399)
1.420
(0.330)
0.655
(0.206)
1.172
(0.447)
1.020
(0.217)
1.560*
(0.379)
1.197
(0.235)
0.752
(0.178)
Price con-
tract
2.530***
(0.665)
1.612
(0.556)
1.999**
(0.704)
1.410
(0.357)
1.640**
(0.405)
1.206
(0.358)
0.616
(0.264)
1.310
(0.291)
1.083
(0.276)
1.016
(0.206)
1.262
(0.280)
Diversifi ca-
tion
1.495
(0.377)
2.425**
(0.866)
0.879
(0.267)
1.333
(0.299)
1.644**
(0.416)
2.891***
(0.888)
1.272
(0.426)
1.248
(0.241)
1.813***
(0.369)
0.874
(0.157)
1.185
(0.260)
On-farm 
processing/ 
sales
0.547*
(0.194)
1.008
(0.437)
1.769
(0.892)
0.633
(0.207)
1.074
(0.338)
3.155***
(1.040)
1.309
(0.585)
1.417
(0.379)
0.879
(0.272)
0.762
(0.203)
3.529***
(0.976)
Off-farm 
investment
1.680
(0.720)
0.414*
(0.202)
0.810
(0.419)
1.246
(0.479)
0.507
(0.235)
1.430
(0.499)
1.178
(0.540)
1.128
(0.375)
3.301***
(1.144)
2.275***
(0.701)
2.964***
(1.024)
Credit 
avoidance
0.662*
(0.155)
0.658
(0.203)
1.602
(0.473)
0.957
(0.204)
1.427
(0.327)
1.195
(0.235)
1.463
(0.385)
1.098
(0.363)
3.237***
(0.628)
0.964
(0.167)
0.755
(0.164)
Financial 
reserves
0.850
(0.215)
0.968
(0.334)
1.341
(0.437)
1.592*
(0.389)
0.978
(0.260)
1.875***
(0.393)
0.923
(0.277)
3.356***
(1.163)
3.164***
(0.606)
1.001
(0.186)
1.187
(0.282)
Off-farm 
employment
0.468***
(0.110)
0.897
(0.251)
0.846
(0.238)
1.208
(0.243)
0.939
(0.209)
0.838
(0.161)
0.772
(0.212)
2.102**
(0.663)
0.973
(0.174)
0.984
(0.191)
1.627**
(0.327)
Other gain-
ful activities
1.843**
(0.487)
1.049
(0.343)
1.638
(0.626)
0.751
(0.185)
1.165
(0.296)
1.188
(0.286)
3.639***
(1.027)
3.325***
(1.163)
0.788
(0.178)
1.129
(0.277)
1.754***
(0.353)
Constant 0.259
(0.232)
0.00832***
(0.00768)
0.884
(1.199)
0.920
(0.713)
0.0404***
(0.0276)
0.392**
(0.185)
0.0517***
(0.0235)
0.0126***
(0.00842)
0.502
(0.216)
0.144***
(0.0708)
0.664
(0.191)
0.0875***
(0.0422)
Random effects
Member 
State
63.72
(208.1)
2.202
(3.822)
1.890e+06
(1.885e+07)
41.62
(99.85)
5.549
(7.855)
1.801
(1.088)
1
(0)
2.279
(1.643)
1.978
(0.923)
2.311
(1.322)
1.155
(0.142)
2.474
(1.422)
Farming 
type
38.87***
(53.29)
14,617**
(65,172)
1.625
(0.591)
1.258
(0.239)
8.240**
(7.139)
4.257**
(2.498)
1.890*
(0.620)
1.174
(0.455)
1.605**
(0.343)
1.916**
(0.616)
1.105
(0.108)
1
(0)
Number of observations = 819; number of groups = 8; standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Source: own data
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Discussion
We quantifi ed the adoption rates of different risk manage-
ment tools and determinants of farmers’ choice. In the scope 
of the FLINT project several indicators for risk management 
strategies were added to the regular FADN data collection 
to allow for an extended set of analyses. The availability 
of information on insurances and other risk management 
tools is very limited or too much aggregated in the current 
FADN (EC, 2015). The FLINT indicators revealed that 
adoption rates of instruments such as insurance contracts, 
price contracts, off-farm income, other risk reduction meas-
ures and other gainful activities vary signifi cantly across EU 
Member States and farming types. Bielza et al., (2008) also 
report that insurance uptake in agriculture is heterogeneous 
across Member States. Moreover, current results are in line 
with past results with respect to hedging against price risks 
which is adopted by only 2-3 per cent of European farm-
ers (Szekely and Pálinkás, 2009). The econometric analysis 
indicates that larger farms more often adopted crop insur-
ance, occupational accident insurance, price contracts and 
diversifi cation but were less likely to adopt credit avoidance 
and off-farm employment (at a signifi cance level of 1 per 
cent). The positive relationship between farm size and insur-
ance purchase was also shown in other studies (Goodwin 
et al., 2004; Sherrick et al., 2004). Previous studies mostly 
focused on insurance adoption while our work focused on 
a broader set of risk management strategies. Also Huirne 
et al. (2007) emphasised that whole-farm risk management 
approaches, i.e. approaches in which multiple risks and 
farm activities are considered simultaneously, are essential 
in understanding adoption levels and determinants of adop-
tion at farm level.
Monitoring and evaluating the adoption rates, and deter-
minants of adoption, of the aforementioned strategies is 
important when evaluating policies where targeting is rel-
evant and where linkages or trade-offs between policy objec-
tives exist. For example, the existing CAP direct payments 
stabilise farm incomes potentially, reducing the demand for 
risk management strategies (OECD, 2009). Recent CAP 
reforms (2014-2020) encourage the adoption of agricultural 
insurance by providing premium subsidies. At the same 
time the reduced level of market management brought about 
through recent and ongoing CAP reforms has signifi cantly 
reduced the CAP’s price supporting effects. Despite the 
potential positive benefi ts of contracts, no specifi c measures 
were included in the 2013 reform, thereby leaving it up to the 
market to establish contracts. Given the continuous evolu-
tion of the CAP and the expectation that risk management 
will continue to grow in importance, it is now both timely 
and relevant to take stock of current evaluation practices 
and specifi cally focus on which risk management indicators 
could help to evaluate and develop future polices.
Most elicited new indicators focus on the adoption of risk 
management strategies and are therefore binary. Yet, farm-
ers’ decisions to adopt a specifi c risk management tool are 
often continuous-choice decisions. For example, decisions to 
insure or contract follows a (binary) adoption decision and 
subsequently a (continuous) conditional decision about the 
amount (e.g. proportion of production insured or contracted). 
This simplifi cation holds for all insurance adoption indica-
tors, as well as indicators capturing on-farm processing and 
the use of other gainful activities. In the current approach, 
the decision is being modelled as a discrete-choice decision. 
Eliciting continuous farm level indicators would enable the 
use of double-hurdle models distinguishing the determinants 
of the adoption decision from those of the uptake amount. In 
the fi rst stage of the double-hurdle model, a Probit regres-
sion model is estimated where a decision is transformed into 
a binary variable. The second-stage model is a truncation 
estimation procedure (Heckit model) whereby only observa-
tions of farmers who adopted are included (Heckman, 1979). 
Refi ned model estimates could be applied for the FLINT 
indicators capturing contract use (i.e. proportion of turnover 
contracted) and off-farm employment (i.e. hours worked).
In addition to analysing adoption rates, there is a strong 
policy and research interest in the impact of risk manage-
ment strategies. The impacts of risk management strategies 
are diffi cult to assess with performance indicators obtained 
from a cross-sectional design as is the case in this pilot study. 
Given this lack of information, studies based on FADN have 
focused on income volatility, down-side risk, and price and 
yield volatility (Vrolijk and Poppe, 2008; Kimura et al., 
2010). FADN is generally also used to analyse differences 
in risks between farming systems. For example, Berentsen et 
al. (2012) show that gross margin volatility is signifi cantly 
higher in organic than conventional dairy farming in the 
Netherlands (coeffi cient of variation of 30 vs. 45 per cent) 
caused by both higher price and production risks. Similarly, 
organic arable farms were higher with respect to yields, 
output prices and variable input costs (Berentsen and Van 
Asseldonk, 2016). These studies are however not able to 
relate the risks at farm level to the risk management instru-
ments applied on the farm due to current lack of data. With 
the FLINT indicators the adoption rates can be analysed and 
future research allows analysing the link with the economic 
and sustainability performance of farms. Decisions on adopt-
ing risk management strategies depend on the associated cost 
(e.g. insurance premium) relative to the benefi t perceived 
from the reduction in risk (e.g. indemnities in adverse years). 
Analysing these within farm trade-offs requires mean prof-
its and loss distributions obtained from multiple years. This 
downside-risk reduction and thus impact can only be esti-
mated if the FLINT data collection will be continued to build 
up a panel data set.
In summary, if data collection would be continued for 
several years, the trends in adoption rates can be analysed 
and the impact on the economic and sustainability perfor-
mance of farms could be estimated. The integrated char-
acter of the FLINT + FADN database allows combining 
economic, social and environmental aspects of farming. The 
impact of social indicators on the adoption rates can be ana-
lysed and the impact of risk management instruments on the 
environmental performance can be established (e.g. is there 
a trade-off between crop insurance and use of pesticides). 
For policy analyses these indicators are a step forward for 
the determination of the net impacts and establishment of 
counterfactuals in the long term with FADN (i.e. time series 
encompassing also adverse years) for measuring the impact 
of the CAP at farm level.
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